Due Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of Inductive Risk

Value of the Information & Strength of the Argument

The talk offers a valuable contribution by dissecting the argument from inductive risk and showing its reliance on a specific view of induction. Risjord’s distinction between decisions and recognitions is insightful, and his critique of the decision lemma is well-argued. He systematically addresses various justifications, showing their weaknesses. The argumentation is solid, though some parts are condensed due to time constraints.

Scientific Rigor, Source Quality, Title Accuracy

Risjord demonstrates rigorous engagement with the literature, referencing key figures like Rudner, Levi, Jeffrey, Mitchell, Audi, and others. He uses a case study (HUD audit study) to illustrate his points. The title accurately reflects the content, focusing on due diligence and epistemic caution. The talk is well-structured and the argument is presented clearly.

The title accurately reflects the content, focusing on due diligence and epistemic caution in the context of inductive risk.

8/10

The talk is a rigorous philosophical analysis by a recognized expert in philosophy of science. It engages with the relevant literature and presents a novel argument, but as a single lecture it lacks the full peer-review context of a published paper.

Markers derived by PSI from the transcript: the creator did not define chapters.

• 00:00Introduction by Edward, presenting Mark Risjord.
• 02:00Risjord introduces his book project on the value-free ideal and the focused defense.
• 05:00Overview of the argument from inductive risk and the threshold picture.
• 10:00Discussion of the equivalence assumption and the decision lemma.
• 15:00Critique of the uncertainty and underdetermination justifications for the decision lemma.
• 20:00Examination of other justifications, including inductive skepticism and pragmatism.
• 25:00Analysis of the error argument and its connection to the decision lemma.
• 30:00Proposal of an alternative view of induction consistent with impartiality.
• 35:00Conclusion and implications for scientific practice.

• Rudner, R. (1953). The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments. — Foundational paper on inductive risk.
• Levi, I. (1960). Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments? — Discussed in relation to the equivalence assumption.
• Jeffrey, R. (1956). Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses. — Rejection of the acceptance assumption.
• Mitchell, S. (2004). The Prescribed and Proscribed Values in Science Policy. — Domain of belief vs. action.
• Audi, R. (2001). The Architecture of Justification. — Distinction between decision and recognition.
• Norton, J. (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. — Alternative view of induction.
• Longino, H. (1990). Science as Social Knowledge. — Social epistemology.
• Khalifa, K., Millson, J., & Risjord, M. (2020). Inquisitive Due Diligence. — Epistemic principle.
• Brown, M. (2013). Values in Science: The Error Argument. — Error argument.
• Havstad, J. (2018). The Error Argument. — Error argument.

• Rudner, R. (1953). The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments. — Foundational paper on inductive risk.
• Levi, I. (1960). Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments? — Discussed in relation to the equivalence assumption.
• Norton, J. (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. — Alternative view of induction.
• Longino, H. (1990). Science as Social Knowledge. — Social epistemology.

• Douglas, H. (2000). Inductive Risk and Values in Science. — Douglas argues that inductive risk is pervasive and values are necessary, which contrasts with Risjord's view that it can be avoided.