Bochum - In Person Talk (No Q&A) - Baston: Can Belief Explain Implicit Bias?

Value of the Information & Strength of the Argument

The talk provides a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on implicit bias by critically examining the belief approach. The argumentation is clear and well-structured, systematically presenting Mandelbaum’s view and then raising specific worries. The use of examples from evaluative conditioning effectively illustrates the challenges for the reasons-responsiveness criterion. However, the argument could be strengthened by engaging more deeply with potential responses from proponents of the belief view and by providing more empirical evidence to support the claims.

Scientific Rigor, Source Quality, Title Accuracy

The talk demonstrates scientific rigor by referencing key theories and studies in social psychology and philosophy, such as the Implicit Association Test and meta-analyses on predictive validity. However, specific sources are not cited in detail, which limits the ability to verify claims. The title accurately reflects the content, and the talk stays focused on the central question. The lack of Q&A and limited interaction may reduce the depth of discussion, but the presentation itself is coherent and well-organized.

The title accurately reflects the content, focusing on the question of whether belief can explain implicit bias.

7/10

The talk presents a well-structured philosophical argument, referencing established theories and empirical studies, but lacks detailed citations and empirical verification.

Markers derived by PSI from the transcript: the creator did not define chapters.

• 00:00Introduction and overview of the talk.
• 02:00Background on implicit attitudes and aversive racism.
• 05:00Introduction of the structural belief hypothesis by Eric Mandelbaum.
• 08:00Discussion of reasons-responsiveness and encapsulated belief systems.
• 10:00Example of balance theory and the 'enemy of my enemy' intuition.
• 12:00Critique of the reasons-responsiveness criterion using evaluative conditioning.
• 15:00Proposal of criteria for fitting reasons for evaluations.
• 18:00Conclusion and suggestion of dispositional bundles as alternative.

• Mandelbaum, E. (2016). Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias. — Mentioned as the proponent of the structural belief hypothesis.
• Gendler, T. S. (2008). Alief and Belief. — Mentioned as suggesting that implicit biases are associations.
• Nanay, B. (2016). The Role of Imagination in Implicit Bias. — Mentioned as suggesting unconscious mental imagery.

• Mandelbaum, E. (2016). Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias. — The talk aligns with Mandelbaum's view that implicit biases are beliefs, but critiques the reasons-responsiveness aspect.

• Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. — This work supports the associative account, which contrasts with the belief approach.